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EQUALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCING: MISSOURI'S NEED
FOR REFORM
BRUCE D. JOHNSTON*
Although protests against property taxes persist, Missouri contin-
ues to base its public school financing system on local property taxa-
tion.' The recently amended "foundation program" in Missouri
assures every district a minimum per pupil expenditure level.2 The
scheme further provides low-wealth districts an additional grant to
overcome disparities created by the presence or absence of taxable
property within their boundaries.' This state aid flows to local dis-
tricts in the form of a "guaranteed tax base."4
The financing method attempts to equalize the inequities in per
* B.A., Carleton College, 1976; J.D., Washington University, 1980.
1. During the 1977-78 school year, the relative contributions of school revenues in
Missouri were 48.8% local, 43.0% state, and 8.2% federal. Total school expenditures
in Missouri totaled approximately 1.2 billion dollars. See MISSOURI STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION, 129TH REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF MISSOURI FOR THE
SCHOOL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1978, Table 1(a), p. 46 [hereinafter cited as 1978
SCHOOL REPORT].
2. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 163 (1978).
3, Id § 163.031.
4. Id. § 163.011. For the 1977-78 school year, the "guaranteed tax base" was the
amount in which the 85th percentile of the state aggregate number of pupils fell the
preceding year. Each year thereafter (through 1982-83), the percentile level shall be
increased by one until reaching the 90th, where it will remain.
In order to receive the guaranteed tax base, however, each district must comply
with four basic requirements:
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pupil expenditures between districts,5 but substantial interdistrict dis-
parities remain.' These facts result in the denial of an equal educa-
tional opportunity7 to certain state pupils, and render the Missouri
a) operate schools for at least 180 days per year;
b) maintain adequate and accurate records of attendance, personnel, and
finance;
c) levy a property tax of at least $1.25 per $100 assessed valuation; and
d) compute average daily attendance.
See Id. § 163.021 (1978).
5. See State ex rel. School Dist. of Kansas City v. Young, 519 S.W.2d 328, 333-34
(Mo. App. 1975) (the purpose of § 163.031 is to at least partially equalize relative
disparity in wealth between affluent and less affluent districts by distribution of state
aid).
6. Comparisons in per-pupil expenditures between individual school districts for
1977-78 are astounding. Clayton School District in St. Louis County spends
$3,441.69 per eligible pupil, while the R-IV School District in Ripley County spends
$963.66 per pupil. The Lindbergh School District in St. Louis County, which includes
towns of moderate wealth (Crestwood, Sappington and Sunset Hills), spends
$1,360.37 per pupil. Clayton, Ladue ($2,473.57/pupil), and Brentwood
($2,020.87/pupil) are the only districts spending more than $2,000 per pupil in the St.
Louis County area. St. Louis City spends $1,863.69 per pupil.
The problem with such spending disparities is that the districts spending the most
per pupil use the least burdensome tax rate. Ladue's tax levy is $3.90/$100 assessed
valuation (a.v.), and Clayton's is $3.97/$100 a.v. On the other hand, the Normandy
School District in St. Louis County, which spends $1,475.63/pupil, taxes itself at
$5.19/$100 a.v. Similarly, University City School District with a per pupil expendi-
ture (p.p.e.) of $1,666.02, pays $6.47/$100 a.v. Differences in formula used by the
districts produce the disparate assessed valuation to pupil ratios. Because units of
land in certain areas of the state are valued higher than the same size unit in another
area, the assessment per $100 may be less than other areas, but still provides more
money per unit of land. Clayton, for example, has an a.v./pupil figure of $90,119,
while Normandy's is $19,422, and that of Ripley County (R-IV) is $6,728. For state-
wide data, see 1978 SCHOOL REPORT, supra note 1, at 94-112.
7. Even though commentators have written extensively about "equal educational
opportunity," the definition is by no means clear. Opportunity measured on equal
"inputs" is basically an objective standard, with money as the measuring stick. This
philosophy contends that where there are wide disparities in expenditure levels
among districts, there will be wide disparities in the quality of education and opportu-
nities among those districts. Measuring educational opportunity by inputs makes it
easy to measure amounts of money given, and even if there is no exact "cost-quality"
correlation in education, everyone begins monetarily equal. For a very thorough
analysis of the "inputs" technique, see J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRI-
VATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970); R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN,
REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE (1973); A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS
(1968). See also Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Littgation: A Com-
mentary, 1977 DUKE L. J. 1099, 1107-1109; Note, School Finance Reform: Robinson v.
Cahill, 13 URBAN L. ANN. 139, 148 n.61 (1977).
On the other hand, the "outputs" measurement of equal educational opportunity is
a subjective performance test based on student achievement. Proponents of this tech-
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financing system susceptible to a constitutional challenge. This Note
presents some problems inherent in the Missouri method of distribut-
ing state aid, demonstrates state constitutional attacks on educational
financing systems, and proposes centralized state funding as a legisla-
tive alternative.
I. MissouRi's FOUNDATION PLAN AND ITS PROBLEMS
The Missouri financing scheme guarantees each school district a
specified amount of equalized assessed property valuation per eligi-
ble pupil as a "guaranteed tax base." Missouri statutes provide a
complex formula to determine this "guaranteed tax base" and the
proportionate amount of state financial assistance for each district.8
Basically, the state assures districts in which residential and/or com-
mercial property valuation is low a minimum level of money per pu-
pil. Each district still levies its own property tax expressed as a fixed
nique advocate standardized testing and other similar methods of measuring the qual-
ity of education. Student expenditures are irrelevant. See generally Billings & Legler,
Factors Affecting Educational Opportunity and Their Implications for School Reform:
An Empirical Stud), 4 J. L. & EDUC. 633 (1975).
Many educators have published studies on the "cost-quality" relationship in educa-
tion. Early influential reports reveal that money has little effect on education. See J.
COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 325 (1966) (inequalities in a
child's home and background are more influential than inequalities in education); C.
JENCKS, INEQUALITY 8 (1972) (concluding that educational resources do not have an
effect on standardized test scores). But see J. GUTHRIE, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY
60-62 (1971) (criticizing the methodology of the Coleman Report); Richards, Equal
OpportuntO " and School Finance. Toward a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion. 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32, 54 (1973) (suggesting that the Coleman study and other
similar studies are based on a narrow concept of education, namely verbal skills). See
generaly U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FINANC-
ING SCHOOLS AND PROPERTY TAX RELIEF-A STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1973) [herein-
after cited as COMMISSION REPORT 19731. For a complete list of educational studies,
see COMMISSION REPORT 1973, App. J at 247-261.
These contradictory studies indicate the current inadequacy of social science to
clearly delineate the relationship between cost and quality. Too many rich districts,
however, oppose educational financing reform which assumes money has no impact.
Although money is in and of itself inadequate to equalize districts, poorer ones should
at least have the opportunity to try. Why force a terrible baseball team to play with
seven men? It cannot hurt to start equally. See CooNs, supra, at 30-35.
8. For a detailed explanation of the plan, see Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 163.011(5),
163.031. To compute the guaranteed tax base, school districts are ranked annually
from lowest to highest according to the amount of equalized assessed property valua-
tion per pupil. This tax base is to be gradually increased until each district receives
the amount of valuation/pupil of the district in which the 90th percentile of the state
aggregate number of pupils falls during the preceding year. See also note 4 supra.
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rate per one hundred dollars equalized assessed valuation. 9 The state
simply pays each school district the local tax rate on every one hun-
dred dollars property valuation over and above the district's actual
tax base, up to its guaranteed base. In essence, Missouri provides the
difference between a district's actual revenue and the state guaran-
tee.'
One significant flaw in the Missouri funding program is its failure
to recognize and provide for the elevated expenditures necessary in
large urban environments. Disproportionately high educational costs
in the central city reduce the effective impact of total educational out-
lays covered by state grants." Schools in urban core areas spend
more money for qualified teachers, school safety, and construction
costs than those located in county or rural areas. 2 Additionally, in-
ner-city areas experience heavy noneducational "overburden" obli-
gations which cause further diminution of the equalization aid's
impact.'3 Such expenses include the high commercial costs of main-
taining the central business disctrict, of providing extensive police
and fire protection, and of sustaining numerous health and welfare
services. 14 The overburden problem must be considered by a school
financing plan since the costs tend to absorb large portions of state
aid." Thus, although the St. Louis and Kansas City areas show high
9. The rate must be at least $1.25/$100 a.v. to qualify the district for state aid.
See note 4 supra.
10. There are some technical complications in the formula, however. For exam-
ple, there are variations in the amount of aid received for pupil absences, orphans,
and escheats or forfeitures in the district. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§163.031-.035(2).
11. In addition, inner-city children often have more mental, emotional, and physi-
cal handicaps. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606
(Sup. Ct. 1978) (urban areas experience increased problems over rural areas, includ-
ing a larger number of students with impaired learning readiness, a disproportionate
number of pupils with mental, emotional, and physical health problems and a greater
number of handicapped pupils).
12. See note 11 supra.
13. Inner city "overburden" or noneducational costs greatly outnumber those of
the suburbs. Arguably, the high percentage of the property tax used for such nonedu-
cational expenses acts as a constraint on the tax rate which could be levied for educa-
tion. For an excellent discussion of municipal overburden and its effects on
education, see Zelinsky, Educational Equalization and Suburban Sprawl Subsidizing
the Suburbs Through School Finance Reform, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 161 (1976); Levin,
supra note 7, at 1118.
14. See note 13 supra for an explanation of the constraining effect these overbur-
den expenses have on tax money for education.
15. See note 13 supra.
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per-pupil expenditures, 16 the money does not reflect high quality ed-
ucation, but rather indicates costs not present in most suburban com-
munities. 17
A second problem with the school funding method stems from the
Missouri property assessment procedure. State law demands prop-
erty be assessed at "true value,"'" but uniformity in taxation does not
occur. " The Missouri Supreme Court recently declared that the
state's property assessment practices violated state constitutional and
statutory requirements. The Missouri Supreme Court subsequently
ordered statewide reassessment,20 assigning the task to the legislature.
Nevertheless, many taxpayers continue to pay taxes on grossly under-
valued property assessed years ago. Until legislative action occurs,
the state school financing system will continue to create inequities
among local taxpayers.2'
Furthermore, the Missouri financing scheme disregards the differ-
16. Indeed, urban areas may and often do show high per-pupil expenditures. Ex-
tremely wealthy suburbs have similarly high levels. The core city has the following
combination of characteristics: Large size, low individual income, and a relatively
small proportion of public school pupils. At the other end of the spectrum, the
wealthiest suburbs are characterized by small size, high incomes, and a small percent-
age of students. Between the extremes lies the "classic" suburban area: medium size,
moderate incomes, and a large amount of high school students. Consequently, inner
city areas derive their high p.p.e.'s through large commercial and industrial property
taxes, whereas wealthy suburbs derive theirs through high individual property taxes.
See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 184-85. See generally R. JOHNSTON, URBAN RESI-
DENTIAL PATTERNS (1972); B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, & C. SANDOVAL, THE HIGH COST
OF EDUCATION IN CITIES (1973); R. WOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR
POLITICS (1959); Gans, The White Exodus to Suburbia Steps Up, in CITIES IN
TROUBLE 40 (N. Glazer ed. 1970).
17. Actually, the money also indicates the inefficiency associated with large-scale
enterprise. See Zelinsky, The Cities and the Middle Class: Another Look at the Urban
Crisis, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1081.
18. Mo. REV. STAT. § 137.115 (1978) (provides for property to be annually as-
sessed at 3313% of its true value).
19. The assessment practice in Missouri has been inconsistent and of poor quality.
Assessors must be trained in areas such as construction and the economics of buying
and selling. They must conduct occasional on-site assessments to check on values
reported by property holders. Furthermore, assessment, to be successful, must be fre-
quent; this has not been the case in Missouri. For a general review of assessment
problems, see C. HARRISS, PROPERTY TAXATION IN GOVERNMENT FINANCE 22-32
(1974).
20. Cassilly v. Riney, 576 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1979) (all property owners are com-
pelled to bear their proper share of the tax burden).
21. Whether these inequities remain depends on the new assessment plan devel-
oped by the legislature. The plan is now under consideration.
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ences in "marginal utilities"22 between school districts. It is more dif-
ficult for a poor family to spend tax dollars for education than for a
wealthier one to do so.23 Low-income districts often tax themselves
as heavily as wealthier ones, but the tax dollars expended by a family
in the former are greater than those spent in the latter relative to their
respective incomes.24 The absolute dollars spent by the rich are
much greater when taxing themselves at the same rate as less affluent
districts, but so is their ability to afford the necessities (and the luxu-
ries) of life. Thus, although poorer districts may want to spend more
money for education, they often cannot.
Consequently, the "guaranteed tax base" formula adopted by the
Missouri legislature to finance education appears inadequate to
equalize educational opportunities for elementary and secondary
pupils statewide. Aid channeled to school districts barely serves to
keep poorer districts from closing.25 This denies equal opportunity
for education regardless of what standard applies.26 By attaching lo-
cal property wealth to school district spending, Missouri allows
wealthier districts to achieve high per-pupil expenditure levels rela-
tively easily, while effectively denying lower-income districts the
same opportunity. Herein lies the constitutional challenge to the
funding program.
22. The process is commonly known as the principle of diminishing marginal (not
total) utility. It implies that additional units of any good add proprotionately less to
one's utility. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 15 n.l (1964).
23. See C.S. BENSON, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 78-111 (1968). This
economic principle merely states that it is easier for someone making $100,000 to lose
5% of his income to taxes than it is for someone earning considerably less to do so.
The latter strives to provide food, clothing and shelter for his family; the former has
no such worries. Id
24. See notes 6 & 23 supra.
25. For figures on aid to statewide school districts, see note 6 supra. Indeed, a
temporary shutdown occurred as a result of the 1979 St. Louis public school teachers'
strike. Schools closed for several months while teachers remained adamant in salary
demands. Since the St. Louis Board of Education had insufficient funds to meet the
additional costs, state aid over and above that generated through the financing plan
(approximately $1.3 million) was required to solve the dilemma. See St. Louis Bd. of
Educ. v. St. Louis Teachers' Union, Local 420, No. 792-0048 (St. Louis Dist. Ct., Mo.,
March 5, 1979).
26. See note 7 supra. Even if "inputs" are not measured in determining equal
educational opportunity in future Missouri financing, resources are still required in
some manner. Money is the only common thread in every element in the educational
process-salaries, plant, equipment, guards, libraries, etc. See CooNs, supra note 7,
at 25-30.
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Il. EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION
Before examining the constitutional implications of the Missouri
state aid formula, one should focus on comparable litigation else-
where. Courts quashed early challenges to state school finance laws
under the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution, declaring
that no manageable standards existed to determine educational
"needs."27 Shortly thereafter, in Serrano v. Priest,2" the California
Supreme Court held that the state system of public school financing
was unconstitutional. The California financing plan received a large
portion of its revenue from local property taxation, with accompany-
ing state aid generated through a "foundation program" similar to
that employed in Missouri.29 The court cited plaintiff's claim that the
scheme perpetuated "substantial disparities in the quality and extent
of availability of educational opportunity.""0 Following Serrano,
suits emerged in two-thirds of the states, producing nine decisions
27. Early cases claimed that expenditures must be made on the basis of pupils'
educational needs without regard to the fiscal capacity of local school districts. Suit
was first brought in Illinois, where plaintiffs claimed they were denied a good educa-
tion despite their great "educational needs." McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327,
329 (N.D. 111. 1968), aft'd sub on. mem., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969)
(accepted a presumption that students receiving a more "expensive" education were
better educated, but declared there were no "manageable standards" by which the
court could determine if there was a constitutional violation).
Subsequently, Virginia's system of financing was attacked, and likewise was re-
jected by the court. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969) a/'d
mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970) (court noted that it had "neither the knowledge, nor the
means, nor the power" to tailor money to fit students' needs throughout the state). On
"educational needs," see generally Lindquist & Wise, Developments in Education Lii-
gation: Equal Protection, 5 J. L. & EDUC. 11 (1976).
28. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), on review a/demurrer.
The Serrano decision was the first to require equalization of education expenditures.
29. When Serrano was brought, California revenues were derived from local
property taxes (55.7%), state aid (35.5%), federal funds (6.1%), and miscellaneous
sources (2.7%). The state distributed aid through a foundation program which sup-
plemented local revenue to provide "a minimum amount of guaranteed support to all
districts." For a complete explanation of the California foundation plan at the time
of the Serrano litigation, see id at 589-91, 487 P.2d at 1246-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606-
08.
30. Id at 590-610, 487 P.2d at 1244-1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-15. The California
Supreme Court stated that the system conditioned the quality of education on the
private wealth of the district. Id This formulation has come to be known as the fiscal
neutrality doctrine-that the quality of education should be independent of the
wealth of the area. See Levin, supra note 7, at 1101; Lindquist & Wise, supra note 27,
at 4 n.13.
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within two years.31
This frenetic period of school financing litigation endured until the
United States Supreme Court decided San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.32 The sharply divided Court held the
Texas school finance system, which produced financial inequalities
among school districts, did not violate the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3' The Court found no fundamental
right to education under the Constitution. It applied the traditional
"two-tier" approach to equal protection, and stated that Texas had
shown a rational relationship between its financing system and its
state interest in "retaining local funding incentives."3 4  This
landmark decision effectively blocked all federal equal protection
31. Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shof-
stall, Civ. No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 1, 1972), rev'd, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d
590 (1973); Caldwell v. Kansas, Civ. No. 50616 (Johnson County Dist. Ct., Kan., Aug.
30, 1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187
(1972), supplemented at 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), af das mod iled, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Spano v. Board of Educ. of Lakeland Cent. School
Dist., 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S. 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Sweetwater County Planning
Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
After Serrano, during the peak period (August 1972),more than 50 actions chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state school financing systems were filed in 31 states.
See U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, TASK FORCE ON SCHOOL FINANCE, ANALYSIS OF
INTRASTATE SCHOOL FINANCE COURT CASES (August 1972) (compiled by Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); S. Browning & M. Lehtman, Law Suits
Challenging State School Finance Systems, in App. F. to INEQUALITY IN SCHOOL Fi-
NANCING: THE ROLE OF THE LAW (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Clearinghouse
Publication No. 39, 1972).
32. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. Id at 33-35. The Court determined that education was not a fundamental
right because it was not "explicitly or implicitly" guaranteed by the federal Constitu-
tion. Subsequently, the Court applied the two-tier equal protection approach to the
Texas scheme. Under this method, state laws are evaluated in one of two ways. Us-
ing the less critical "rational basis" standard, a state need only show some reasonable
connection between the law and a legitimate state interest. Under the more demand-
ing "strict scrutiny" standard, a state must justify the law by demonstrating a "com-
pelling state interest." This generally requires the state to show that less restrictive
measures cannot be found to satisfy state objectives. See Gammon, Equal Protection
of the Law and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 11 VAL. U. L.
REV. 435 (1977). See generally W. HAZARD, EDUCATION AND THE LAW; CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS 505-516 (2nd ed. 1978); P. HOLLANDER, LEGAL
HANDBOOK FOR EDUCATORS (1978).
34. 411 U.S. at 25-35. See note 33 supra.
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challenges to school financing.3" Proponents of school finance equal-
ization, however, continued attacking state foundation plans under
state equal protection as well as state education clause provisions.36
A. Post-Rodriguez State Equal Protection Clause Litigation
After Rodriguez eliminated the Fourteenth Amendment basis for
holding California's financing system unconstitutional, the Serrano
court, on remand, held education to be a fundamental right under the
state constitution. 37 The court held the state failed to show a "com-
pelling interest" for tying the financing system to district wealth. In
affirming the trial court in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1J),31 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated that although state equal protection pro-
visions are "substantially the equivalent of" the federal equal
protection clause, they "are possessed of an independent vitality
35. Although Rodriguez is controlling on federal equal protection challenges to
school financing systems, the Court was sharply divided. In the 5-4 decision, five
separate opinions emerged with the dissenters proposing radically different tests. See
text in Part III, infra.
The Court's concern focused on the possible consequences of finding the Texas
educational financing formula unconstitutional. It did not wish to "open the flood-
gates" for similar suits by other Texas municipal services. 411 U.S. at 40. In contrast,
when faced with the same question in Serrano, the California Supreme Court distin-
guished education from other municipal services such as fire protection and public
health because of education's "universal relevance" and its necessary role in a free
enterprise democracy. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-
19. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Invalidating Public School Financing on State
Grounds-Horton r. Meskill, 12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 178, 187 n.66 (1978). For a thorough
criticism of the Rodriguez decision, see Gammon, supra note 33, at 435-50; Lindquist
& Wise. supra note 27, at 5-23.
36. For discussions of such state court actions and legislative proposals in the im-
mediate post-Rodriguez era, see EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATES, MAJOR
CHANGES IN SCHOOL FINANCE: STATEHOUSE SCORECARD (1974); W. GRUBB, NEw
PROGRAMS OF STATE SCHOOL AID (1974); Browning & Long, SchoolFinanceReform
and the Courts After Rodriguez in SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION 81, 96, 101 (J.
Pincus ed. 1974). For an updated list of cases, see Lindquist & Wise, supra note 27, at
3 n.ll.
37. See Serrano v. Priest, No. 938, 254 (L.A. County, Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10,
1974). aj7'd, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
38. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977) (the California
Supreme Court declared that "those individual rights and liberties which lie at the
core of our free and representative form are properly considered fundamental" and
education clearly fits within this category). The court rejected the Rodriguez ap-
proach in assessing "fundamentalness" (the explicit-implicit test), claiming Rodriguez
did not apply by analogy "to the state sphere." Id at 766-67, 557 P.2d at 952, 135
Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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which. . . may demand an analysis different from that which would
obtain if only the federal standard were applicable."39
Subsequently, in Horton v. Meskill,40 the Connecticut Supreme
Court voided the state's school financing scheme4' which consisted of
providing an identical, 'state-determined "flat grant" to each pupil.4 1
The court declared education a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Connecticut Constitution within the meanings of both the Rodriguez
test (a right implicitly or explicitly mentioned in the constitution) and
the Serrano II standard (a right which lies at the "core" of our form
of government).43 Applying its newly defined fundamental rights
test, the court subjected the state-aid formula to strict scrutiny and
struck it down.'
A New York court recently held the state's method of financing
public education unconstitutional in Board of Education, Levittown v.
Nyquist.45 The court found the express linkage of property wealth to
39. Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366. To emphasize that Califor-
nia could act independently of federal Constitutional law in some cases, the court
quoted from People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123
Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975) ("[D]ecisions of the United States Supreme Court defin-
ing fundamental civil rights are persuasive authority. .. ,but are to be followed . .
only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California
law"). For a full discussion of the issues raised by Serrano and Rodriguez, see Future
Directionsfor School Finance Reform, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 293 (1974), re-
printed in FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (B. Levin ed. 1974);
Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equaliy and School Taxes, 73 COLUM.
L. Rnv. 1227 (1973); Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities and
Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CAL. L. REV. 720
(1972).
40. 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). The relative percentages of contributions
to education in Connecticut were approximately 70% local, 25% state, and 5% federal.
Connecticut's financing scheme consisted of a "flat grant" to each pupil in the state.
Every student received exactly the same amount of aid at a level set by the state. Id
at 630, 635, 376 A.2d at 366, 369.
41. Id at 644-46, 376 A.2d at 372-73.
42. See note 40 supra.
43. 172 Conn. at 640-46, 376 A.2d at 371-73.
44. Id at 645-46, 376 A.2d at 374. The court further stated that since the state's
objective of local control over school funding could be achieved by "less onerous
means," the plan's interference with the fundamental right to education was unjustifi-
able. Furthermore, the Connecticut court noted a significant correlation between per-
pupil expenditures and quality education. It ordered the state to substantially provide
equal educational opportunity to its youth. Id at 648-49, 376 A.2d at 374-75.
45. 94 Misc. 2d 466,408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The New York foundation
plan which supplied a minimum per-pupil expenditure level of $1,200 in each district
was unconstitutional because it linked private wealth to school spending. The court
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school spending intolerable. It refused to label education a funda-
mental right, but instead applied the "sliding scale" standard of equal
protection review to evaluate the state aid plan.46 Although the sys-
tem served a state interest, the court ordered the legislature to con-
sider a less objectionable funding alternative.47
Viewing these state equal protection challenges together, the cases
finding a fundamental right to education are better reasoned. Each
state provides some system of public education for school-aged chil-
dren4 1 such that all pupils enjoy a guaranteed right to attend.49 As
society becomes more complex, the need for a quality education for
all is increasingly apparent.
Additionally, the judicial "strict scrutiny" standard applicable
when confronted with fundamental interests is easier to apply than a
"sliding scale" test. The former requires the state to show a compel-
ling state interest for retaining a particular law.5" The sliding scale
approach, on the other hand, mandates the court to measure the
"nexus" between a specific constituitonal guarantee and a nonconsti-
tutional interest to determine the appropriate degree of judicial scru-
tiny.5' This flexible test arguably promotes fairness, but certainly
noted with concern that while the wealthier districts achieved high levels of spending
easily, the poorer districts had to settle for the minimum guarantee. Id at 519-31, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 634-41.
46. Id at 522, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636. The "sliding scale" standard of equal protec-
tion review is a compromise test that lies between "strict scrutiny" and the "rational
basis" standard. Justice Marshall introduced the test in his Rodriguez dissent. See
411 U S. at 102-03. Marshall stated that as the nexus between the specific constitu-
tional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the latter becomes
more fundamental, and the degree of judicial scrutiny must be adjusted accordingly.
Id See also notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text infra.
In applying this flexible text, the New York court declared that if a substantial state
interest was served by the discriminatory plan, it must still consider whether such
state interest could be achieved by a "less objectionable alternative." The court deter-
mined the "maintenance and support" of New York schools could be less onerously
attained. 94 Misc. 2d at 526-27, 532, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 639, 642.
47. 94 Misc. 2d at 469-73, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 610-15. The court also stated that the
financing plan was unconstitutional when reviewed under the less stringent rational
basis test. The system, despite its intended objective of equalizing expenditures, failed
to be rationally connected to legitimate state objectives. Id
48. See note 53 infra.
49. Such right is constitutionally guaranteed in each state. Id See, e.g., Mo.
CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
50. See note 33 supra.
51. See note 46 supra.
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
results in line drawing and judicial guesswork.
B. Post-Rodriguez State Education Clause Litigation
Other attacks upon school financing plans arose under state consti-
tutional clauses providing various educational guarantees. In Robin-
son v. Cahill,2 the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the state's
school financing system on the grounds it violated the state constitu-
tional command to provide a "thorough and efficient system of free
public schools."53 The court held that this condition was not fulfilled
unless the lowest level of school district revenue coincided with the
52. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (declaring the New Jersey educational
financing plan unconstitutional). Since the Robinson decision, a multitude of litiga-
tion developed over the creation of the new plan. See Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J.
464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976) (dissolving injunction as a result of full funding of the new
legislation).
53. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1. Eight states mandate a thorough and effi-
cient system of free public schools. See MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONsT. art.
XIII, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONsT. art.
III, § 14; S.D. CONsT. art. VIII, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art.
VII, § 9.
An Ohio court held in Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A7662725
(Hamilton County C.P. Ct., Ohio, Nov. 28, 1977), that the discrimination against
school children created by the state funding program impaired a fundamental inter-
est. The state constitution guarantees the right of school-aged children to attend
school in a "thorough and efficient system of common schools." The court pro-
claimed that the system failed under either the strict scrutiny test (requiring a compel-
ling state interest to support the existing financing system) or the more deferential
equal protection test (requiring merely a rational basis between the system and its
purpose of equalizing school district spending).
In denying the Colorado State Board of Education's motion to dismiss an action
challenging the constitutionality of that state's school financing system, the district
court applied the Rodriguez test. The court held that education was a fundamental
right explicitly guaranteed by the state constitution which provided that the legisla-
ture establish and manitain a "thorough and uniform system of free public schools."
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. C-73688, slip op. at 20-22 (Denver
County Dist. Ct., Colo., Dec. 12, 1977). The court went on to note, however, that
there is such a close relationship in Colorado between "public education and other
rights traditionally recognized as basic and essential to citizenship" (i.e., the right to
vote, effectively participate in the political process, etc.) that education is also a funda-
mental right implicitly guaranteed by the Colorado Constitution. .d at 22-27.
Many other states have similar provisions. Although the language varies, almost
all state constitutions contain an express provision guaranteeing a free public educa-
tion. For a summary of state constitutional provisions, see OFFICE OF EDUCATION,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRO-
VISIONS AND SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE
(DHEW Pub. No. (OE) 73-00002, 1973) [hereinafter cited as OFFICE OF EDUCATION
REPORT].
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desired quality of education statewide. The Robinson court aban-
doned the mechanical two-tier approach to equal protection in favor
of a balance that "weighs the nature of the restraint or denial against
the apparent public justification."54 Finding no equal protection vio-
lation, the court stated that "the Constitution's guarantee must be un-
derstood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in
the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen."55
Several years later, the Washington Supreme Court in Seattle
School District No. I v. Washington56 held that the state constitution
created a mandatory, judicially enforceable duty upon the state legis-
lature to generate funds sufficient for a basic program of education.57
The constitutional language placed the "paramount duty" on the
state to "make ample provision" for education. 8 The court found
that the existing system, which authorized the use of special excess
levies to provide educational funds,5 9 failed to fulfill this duty; school
54. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. at 492, 303 A.2d at 282. Accord, Olsen v. State,
276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976). The Robinson court stated that in applying such a
"balancing" approach, the question is whether the state action is arbitrary. If so, the
court may call upon the state to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient public need
for the restraint or denial. 62 N.J. at 492, 303 A.2d at 282.
Other state courts also have considered the issue addressed in Robinson, but few
have followed the Robinson approach. See Comment, Constitutional Law--School
Financing System Based on Local Property Taxes Violative of Equal Protection Clause
of State Constitution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 322, 330 n.52 (1978).
55. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. The court further held
there was no relationship betewen the educational needs of school districts and their
tax bases. Due to the system's heavy reliance on local property taxes, and the wide
disparities in assessed valuation of taxable property per pupil, the court ordered that
the constitutional mandate to provide "thorough and efficient" schools could not be
satisfied unless the lowest level of dollar performance coincided with the commanded
quality of education. All efforts beyond the minimum had to be attributable to local
decisions to do more than the state was obliged to do. Id at 516, 303 A.2d at 295.
56. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The Seattle case overrules Northshore v.
Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178, insofar as it is inconsistent.
57. 90 Wash. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97. The Washington Supreme Court held the
state's "paramount duty" created a correlative right on behalf of all resident children
to have the state make ample provision for their education. In interpreting this "am-
ple provision" language, the court stated it means more "than mere reading, writing,
and arithmetic; the duty embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the con-
temporary setting to equip children for their role as citizens. ... .Id at 480-85, 585
P.2d at 94.
58. See WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (It is the "paramount duty of the state to make
ample provision" for education.).
59. The Washington legislature authorized school districts to supplement insuffi-
cient state funding by resorting to special excess levy elections. The scheme enables a
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
financing must instead be generated "through dependable and regu-
lar tax sources." 60
Challenges to state funding plans under various state education
clauses cannot be analyzed together, since each clause has unique
constitutional language mandating the necessary statewide educa-
tional standard.61 State courts must interpret these distinct provi-
sions before any clear definitions of "education" are revealed. Only
when one state's clause is nearly identical to another's will a case
study of such similar state's section be persuasive.62
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MISSOURI EDUCATION
The Missouri education clause, unlike other state constitutions, ex-
plicitly outlines the importance of education and the preservation of
fundamental liberties.63 Despite attempts in 1875 and 1945 to excise
it, this provision remains intact.' The 1875 Constitutional Conven-
tion's Education Committee reported that the education clause pro-
district to seek more adequate funding from the local electorate. Districts receive the
bulk of state funds through an apportionment formula which operates on the premise
of an equal guarantee in dollars for each "weighted" (a variable taking into account
the costs to particular districts, training of faculty and other subjective elements) stu-
dent enrolled. In the 1974-75 school year, Seattle School District No. 1 raised 37.7%
of its total revenues through special excess levies. See 90 Wash. 2d at 460, 481, 483,
585 P.2d at 78, 98, 100.
60. Id at 485, 585 P.2d at 99. The court merely held the "special excess levies"
used by Washington to finance education could not be the main source of revenue.
Such levies may be used to fund enrichment programs at the local level which exceed
the constitutional requirements. Id
61. See notes 63 & 85-87 and accompanying text infra.
62. See Office of Education Report, supra note 53, for a total list of state educa-
tion clauses. A state court interpretation of a provision identical with that of another
state can be helpful in the constitutional construction of the latter.
63. Compare Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § l(a), infra note 68, with CONN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1 ("There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the
state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by legislation."); Cal.
Const. art. IX, § 1 ("[K]nowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation
of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage. . . the pro-
motion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.") and id § 5
("The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools . . . at least six
months in every year.").
64. See 9 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at
87-92 (I. Loeb and F. Shoemaker eds. 1920) [hereinafter cited as 1875 DEBATES];
Transcripts of the Debates of the 1945 Missouri Constitutional Convention, April 28,
1944, at 1800-03 [hereinafter cited as 1945 Transcripts].
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motes education as "organic and fundamental."65 This constitutional
interpretation supports the view that education is a fundamental right
in Missouri.
In 1927, the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel Roberts v.
Wilson66 held that the right of children to attend public school "is not
a privilege dependent upon the discretion of any one, but is afunda-
mental right, which cannot be denied except for the general wel-
fare."67 Furthermore, the preamble of the Missouri education article
strenuously emphasizes the nexus between a system of free public
schools and the "preservation of the rights and liberties of the peo-
ple.""8 The language closely resembles that of the California educa-
tion clause,6 9 on which the Serrano II court relied to attach a
fundamental right to education.7" Justice Brennan proposed this
"nexus" test to determine the fundamentality of education in his dis-
senting opinion in Rodriguez.7 Looking to the importance of educa-
tion in comparison with those rights "which are in fact
constitutionally guaranteed," Brennan averred a fundamental right
65 1875 DEBATES, supra note 64 ("The education of the people is to be interwo-
ven with the very framework of the commonwealth. It is not to be left to the ever-
changing whim and indefinable caprice of the Legislature, but is to be made organic
and fundamental.").
66 221 Mo. App. 9, 297 S.W. 419 (1927).
67 Id at 13, 297 S.W. at 420. Accord, Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W.
765, 766 (1891). The Wilson decision was based on the 1875 Missouri Constitution's
education clause. The 1945 provision, however, which is the current law, differs only
in increasing the maximum age of pupils from 20 to 21 years. Compare Mo. CONST.
oF 1875, art. XI, § 1 with Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a).
68. Mo. Const. art. IX, § (a) states:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preserva-
tion of the rights and liberties of the people, the general assembly shall establish
and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in
this state within ages not in excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law.
Among the "rights and liberties" mentioned in the education preamble are those
specifically guaranteed by the Missouri Bill of Rights. See Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-31.
69. See note 63 supra.
70. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
71. 411 U.S. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussion of the "nexus" between
specific constitutional guarantees and nonconstitutional interests). Studies have been
done on "legal socialization." Based on developmental theories, research conclusions
have begun to support the contention of Justices Brennan and Marshall that there is a
strong nexus between education and an understanding and exercise of legal and polit-
ical rights. See Lindquist & Wise, supra note 27, at 20-21 n.82. See also Tapp &
Levine, Legal Socialization. Strategiesfor an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1974).
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to education.7" Given the express relationship between education
and other clearly fundamental rights in the Missouri Constitution,
under the nexus test, education should be a fundamental interest.
Despite the education clause's pronouncement of a fundamental
right to education, it makes no reference to the quality or kind of
education required.73 The state constitution, however, contains an
obscure provision (the deficiency funds clause) in the education arti-
cle that arguably mandates a specific level of state support for public
schools.7 4 If revenues to the public schools become insufficient to sus-
tain them for at least eight months, under the clause, the general as-
sembly may provide for the deficiency.75 Although the deficiency
funds clause has never been used to challenge the adequacy of state
support to public schools, such use is consistent with the legislative
history and judicial interpretation of the section.
The Missouri Constitution of 1865 originally contained the defi-
ciency clause.76 It authorized the general assembly to levy a local
property tax if contributions from the state and county school funds77
proved inadequate to support schools.7" The 1865 version of the
72. 411 U.S. at 62-63. The nexus test would be particularly effective in a school
financing case brought under the Missouri equal protection clause, largely because
the Missouri education article recognizes an express connection between education
and other clearly fundamental rights, such as the right to vote and to exercise free
speech. See note 68 supra.
73. See note 68 supra. The Education Committee of the 1875 Missouri Constitu-
tional Convention declined to adopt a resolution calling for the addition of the words
"thorough and efficient" to the language of this section. 1 JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at 187 (I. Loeb and F. Shoemaker eds.
1920). The rejection of such language, however, should not preclude the necessity for
a quality education. The drafters of the 1875 Convention may have felt that the
"thorough and efficient" language was redundant. See notes 64 & 65 supra.
74. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 3(b) ("In event the public school fund provided and set
apart by law for the support of free public schools, shall be insufficient to sustain free
shcools at least eight months in every year .. , the general assembly may provide for
such deficiency").
75. Id
76. Mo. CONST. OF 1865, art. IX, § 8.
77. The county school fund consisted of the income and proceeds from all land
designated by the federal government to be used for school purposes. The state
school fund was established out of the proceeds from escheats, penalties, forfeitures,
fines, the sale of public lands and estrays, and "so much of the ordinary revenue of
the state as may be necessary." Id § 5.
78. The major difference in the 1865 deficiency funds clause and the present one
is that the former required only sufficient funds to sustain schools four months per
year. Compare Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 3(b) with Mo. CONST. OF 1865, art. IX, § 8.
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clause, however, did not require the general assembly to provide
direct financial support to local school districts.7
The 1875 Constitutional Convention modified the provision, guar-
anteeing sufficient appropriation to the public school fund each year
to insure the operation of all state public schools."0 Subsequently, the
Missouri Supreme Court held in State ex re. Sharp v. Miller"' that
the phrase 'the general assembly may provide" constituted an ab-
solute command to the legislature and not merely legislative discre-
tion.8 2 This interpretation of the clause remains authoritative; the
duty lies with the legislature to sustain financially troubled school
districts for at least eight months each year. 3
Based on the education and deficiency funds clauses of the state
constitution, the present Missouri system of financing public educa-
tion exposes itself to constitutional attack. Missouri courts, however,
must analyze the meaning of the word "sustain" in this constitutional
context before determining whether the deficiency funds clause be-
comes a tool in such an attack."4 Courts have held the phrases "thor-
79. See note 76 supra.
80. See 1875 DEBATES, supra note 64, at 243-48, 259-89. The Constitutional Con-
vention of 1875 failed in its initial attempt for minimum legislative appropriations to
the public school fund. The Education Committee chairman finally introduced a
modified deficiency funds clause which guaranteed enough money to insure the oper-
ation of a school district in all regions of the state. This modified provision was
adopted after heavy debate. Subsequently, the education article was amended to re-
quire at least 25% of the state's revenue be applied annually for the support of free
public schools. See id at 39, 282-89.
81 65 Mo. 50 (1877).
82. id at 54.
83. The Constitutional Convention of 1945 retained the deficiency funds clause
wihtout debate. Two minor changes were made; the minimum school term was in-
creased from four to eight months, and the 1875 reference to § I 1 of the Article on
Revenue and Taxation (Mo. CoNsT. OF 1875, art. X, § 11) was abolished. The latter
had been included to prevent the legislature from remedying deficiencies by imposing
a direct tax on districts unable to maintain four-month schools. See 1875 DEBATES,
supra note 64, at 259-80, 1945 Transcripts, supra note 64, at 1852.
Statements made at the 1945 Constitutional Convention emphasize the state's duty
to maintain the statewide school system. See 1945 Transcripts, supra note 64, at 1796
(comments from the chairman of the Education Committee) ("This is a state school
system and it's the state's obligation to see that we have a school system, and if the
money doesn't come from other sources, why, I never could see anything wrong with
the state supplying the money.").
84. Arguably, even if "sustain" is interpreted as some minimal quantity of fund-
ing to individual school districts, which is extremely unlikely based on past interpreta-
tions of the deficiency funds clause, the Missouri financing scheme still fails to so
provide. See notes 80 & 83 supra. Note 25 supra discusses whether the legislature
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ough and efficient," 5 "maintenance and support," 6 and "free public
elementary and secondary schools" 7 to be constitutional mandates
to various state legislatures to provide equal per-pupil expenditures
in every state district. Analogously, the provisions in the Missouri
Constitution demand fiscal equality in local school districts.
The Missouri education clause states that both a "diffusion of
knowledge" and "intelligence" are essential to the preservation of the
rights and the liberties of the people.8" Indeed, a quality education is
necessary in our democratic, free enterprise system and must stand
apart from other municipal services of lesser import.8 9 An equal un-
derstanding and an exercise of one's legal and political rights stem
only from equal educational backgrounds.9" The state legislature
cannot condition the receipt of such a fundamental right as education
upon district wealth.9 Equality in funding cannot guarantee that
each pupil will obtain an equal amount of "knowledge" or "intelli-
gence." Although subjective concepts such as knowledge and intelli-
gence are not easily measured, equal financing initially gives each
pupil similar equipment, teachers, and other facilities. These equal
objective inputs promote educational environments where the man-
dated "diffusion of knowledge" is more likely to be realized by every
pupil.9
2
can sit and watch public schools remain closed for months due to a teachers' strike.
Seemingly, the general assembly must provide funds in circumstances such as this to
"sustain" school districts for eight months. See notes 81 & 82 and accompanying text
supra.
85. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 513-20, 303 A.2d 273, 294-98 (1973). See
notes 53-55 supra.
86. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 523-25, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 636-38
(1978). See notes 45-47 supra.
87. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 640-46, 376 A.2d 359, 374-76 (1977). See
notes 40-44 supra.
88. See note 68 supra.
89. See notes 35 & 53 supra.
90. See notes 68 & 71 supra.
9 1. See generally Silard and Goldstein, Toward,4boltlon of Local Funding in Pub-
lic Education, 3 J. L. & EDUC. 307 (1974).
92. Of course, this re-opens the argument concerning whether equal monetary
"inputs" promote equal learning. It suffices to say that one may never be sure. But
money is the only objective element in the learning process which can be accurately
measured; it is also a common factor in all school districts. Consequently, equalizing
revenues to school districts should equalize educational opportunities as much as pos-
sible. See note 7 supra.
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In addition to the education provision, the Missouri Constitution
contains an express equal protection clause,93 as well as a section
prohibiting the creation of special and local laws.94 The Missouri
Supreme Court affords equal protection of the law to a given class of
persons only when they are "subjected to like and equal condi-
tions."" Furthermore, Missouri equal protection language appears
more explicit than the federal provision in entitling all persons to
"equal rights and opportunities under the law."96 Clearly, pupils re-
93. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2 states:
That all constitutional government is intended to promote the general welfare of
the people; that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; that all persons
are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law;
that to give security to these things is the principal office of government, and that
when government does not confer this security, it fails in its chief design.
94. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 40(30). This provision is interpreted similarly to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The section provides that "the
general assembly shall not pass any local or special law. . . where a general law can
be made applicable," and the applicability of such general law is a judicial question.
See State ex rel. Toedebusch Transfer, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 520 S.W.2d 38
(Mo. 1975); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. State, 348 Mo. 725, 155 S.W.2d 107 (1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 700 (1942).
95 See King v. Swenson, 423 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1968) (the general purpose of
federal and state equal protection provisions is to prevent invidious discrimination.
Statutory classification does not violate constitutional limitation if all persons in the
same class are treated equally.); Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1959) (the state equal protection clause does not prohibit classi-
fication of the subjects of legislation if all persons within the same class are included
and treated alike); Walters v. City of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377 (1953),
aff'd 347 U.S. 231 (1954) (statutory classification does not violate the constitution if
all persons within the same class are treated with equality); State v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 362 Mo. 299, 240 S.W.2d 886 (1951), af'd 342 U.S. 421 (1952) ("When all
persons within the purview of the statute are subjected to like conditions, they are
afforded equal protection of the law"); State, on Inf. of Taylor v. Currency Services,
Inc., 358 Mo. 983, 218 S.W.2d 600 (1949) (the legislature may pass laws applicable to
a particular class of individuals, but such laws must bear equally on all individuals
coming naturally within that class); Ballantine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378
(1942).
96. Compare Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2. supra note 80, with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ I ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws"). The Missouri equal protection clause contains basically the same
provisions as the 1875 Missouri Constitution's clause (see Mo. CONST. OF 1875, art.
II, § 4). The phrase "that all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights
and opportunity under the law" was added to the constitution in 1945, however,
showing the significance the 1945 Convention attached to equal opportunities. See
note 92 supra.
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siding in districts having low-pupil expenditures receive none of these
"equal opportunities."
Missouri courts, however, have seldom interpreted the state equal
protection clause contrary to requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the federal Constitution.97 In Bopp v. Spainhower,98 for ex-
ample, the Missouri Supreme Court held the appropriate standard of
review for state equal protection claims is the "rational basis" test
when "no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imper-
iled."9 9 But a quality education remains a federal "right which must
be made available to all on equal terms" since Brown v. Board of
Education.'°° This guaranteed right to education certainly com-
mands a stricter level of judicial scrutiny than the "rational basis"
test when reviewing the Missouri school financing plan.
The Rodriguez decision represents persuasive authority regarding
challenges to the Missouri scheme brought solely under state equal
protection provisions. Courts that traditionally interpret their state
equal protection clauses in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment refuse to do so in attacks on state educational financing pro-
grams.' The United States Supreme Court proclaimed the highest
court in any state is the final judge of what is unconstitutional under
state law.' 2 Should Missouri interpret state laws independently of
federal influence, the state school financing scheme will fail to pass
constitutional muster. 0 3
Even if state courts continue to construe state and federal provi-
sions similarly, the Missouri financing system remains vulnerable.
97. See In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1973); State v. Stock, 463
S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1971); Gem Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien, 374 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. en banc
1964) ("decisions of this state are in harmony with the federal cases. .
98. 519 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1975).
99. Id at 289.
100. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See note 104 infra.
101. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345, 366 (1977) (California laws possess an "independent vitality"); Horton v. Mes-
kill, 172 Conn. 615, 625-40, 376 A.2d 359, 365-75 (1977). (Although the majority
opinion acknowledged that the interpretation of the Connecticut equal protection
clause traditionally paralleled that of the federal Constitution, the court stated it need
not apply the United States Supreme Court's equal protection analysis to state law
questions).
102. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210 (1960). For a general analysis, see
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 543 (3d ed. 1976) (United States Supreme Court con-
siders state supreme courts the final authority on questions pertaining to state law),
103. See notes 33 & 34 supra.
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The United States Supreme Court holds education in high esteem. °4
Consequently, Missouri courts may adjust the standard of judicial
review of the existing foundation plan to a "sliding scale," consider-
ing the relative importance of the system compared to the rights of
the pupils it affects.' 5 Several courts have overturned state financing
programs similar to Missouri's by reviewing the schemes under a "ra-
tional basis" standard."° In Missouri, review of the "guaranteed tax
base" formula under strict scrutiny virtually guarantees the plan's
doom: review under some lesser standard, 0 7 however, certainly does
not preclude such a result.
Should proponents of an attempt to overturn the state funding sys-
tem be thwarted by the judiciary, the possibility of change through
legislative amendment remains. Indeed, Texas altered its formula for
financing public education no less than twice after Rodriguez held the
system constitutional." 8 The Supreme Court stated that although
financing schemes relying on local property taxes for revenue needed
104. See School Dist. of Abmgton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurnng) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital
civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government."); Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("lilt is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion Such an opportunity. is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms."), (emphasis added) Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("American
people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of
supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.").
105. See note 46 supra. Justice Marshall claimed the Court had always applied a
"spectrum" of standards varying according to the fundamentality of the classifications
involved, the relative constitutional and societal significance of the interest adversely
affected, and the available legislative alternatives. See San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); James
v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See
generaly Gammon, supra note 33.
A court in New York recently invalidated that state's educational financing scheme
(which is quite similar to the Missouri plan) when subjecting it to "sliding scale"
review. See note 46 supra.
106. See notes 47 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
107. The history, development, and proposed changes in equal protection stan-
dards of review have been thoroughly critiqued. For a compilation of such analyses,
see Gammon, supra note 33, at 438-39 n.13.
108. Texas reformed its foundation plan for educational finance twice since Rodri-
guez. See 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 334, §§ 1-16, at 877; 1977 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.,
1st Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § I, at I 1 (Vernon). The present Texas financing system, how-
ever, is under constant attack. See generally Note, Texas School Finance. The Incom-
pautbilizy of Proper/v Taxation and Quality Education, 56 TEx. L. REv. 253 (1978)
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reform, ultimate solutions "must come from the law makers, and
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them."' 0 9 It be-
comes imperative to propose an alternative financing plan for Mis-
souri.
IV. CENTRALIZED STATE FUNDING: A LEGISLATIVE
ALTERNATIVE
No property tax system remedies the basic incompatability of qual-
ity education and property taxation."10 By using local taxes as the
primary means of funding education, Missouri's financing system fo-
cuses not on actual educational needs, but rather on citizens' willing-
ness to allow their property to be taxed."' The total financial
resources of the state must be equally available to all public school
[hereinafter cited as Texas School Finance] (proposing "regionalism" in school dis-
trict organization or hopefully full state funding for Texas).
109. 411 U.S. at 59.
110. Property tax administration may serve to minimize inequitable tax assess-
ment practices, but the underlying incompatibility of private wealth and quality edu-
cation remains. See Silard & Goldstein, supra note 91, at 329 (The inequality has its
roots in the fact that, except for a few highly homogeneous states, the aggregate as-
sessable property per child varies greatly among the districts of the state .... Natu-
rally, rich localities can produce greater revenues). See also COMMISSION REPORT
1973, supra note 7, at 93 ("The principle that the quality of a student's public elemen-
tary and secondary education should not be dependent on the wealth of his parents
and neighbors stands out as a sound objective of public school finance policy...").
Critics have dealt extensively with educational inequities produced by school
finance systems dependent upon property wealth. See generally J. BERKE, ANSWERS
TO INEQUITY: AN ANALYSIS OF NEW SCHOOL FINANCE (1974); J. BERKE, A. CAMP-
BELL, & R. GOETTEL, FINANCING EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1972); J.
COONS, supra note 7; J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS
AND INEQUALITY (1971); R. HARRISON, EQUALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE
(1976); R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE (1973).
111. The local property tax is extremely unpopular. One commentator summa-
rizes the reasons for its unpopularity as follows:
I) the local property tax bears harshly on low-income families ("capriciously
related to the flow of cash into the household");
2) it affects homeowners most heavily;
3) its administration is non-uniform and arbitrary;
4) periodic reappraisal of property produces a tax "shock"-dramatic in-
creases reflect inflation of property values that hit the property owner in one
lump sum; and
5) payment of this local tax is more painful than the "pay as you go" income
and sales taxes.
Shannon, The Property Tax: Reform or Relief, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM 25 (G.
Peterson ed. 1973).
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children.1I 2 The ultimate responsibility for providing equal educa-
tional opportunities lies with the state.' 13 It is obliged to give the less
economically favored pupils educational programs similar in quality
and breadth to those received by the more affluent." 4 Missouri must
assume its burden and allot revenue to districts on an equal and uni-
form basis. Consequently, full state funding," 5 independent of local
property taxation, rather than a revised foundation program, 16 rep-
112. See J. COONS, supra note 7, at 45.
113. See generally Mo. CONST. art. X.
114. J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1974);
E. REUTTER, JR., SCHOOLS AND THE LAW (1970).
115. Full state funding is a radical proposal totally abolishing local property taxa-
tion as a revenue source for public education. It provides an easy means of equalizing
expenditures between districts, and affords the opportunity to take differences in edu-
cational needs and local costs into account. State funding gives the state legislatures
the flexibility to balance educational costs among various tax bases and to channel
funds to the educational needs and socioeconomic character of school districts. For a
general explanation of full state funding and its consequences, see Thomas, Equalizing
Educational Opportunity Through School Finance Reform: A Review Assessment, 48
U. CiN. L. REV. 255, 302-03 (1979).
Full state funding has been completely endorsed by the Advisory Council on Inter-
governmental Relations, President's Commission on School Finance, the State of Ha-
waii, Former Governor Anderson of Minnesota, Governor Milliken of Michigan, the
New York Commission on Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary and Secon-
dary Education, and the Citizen's Commission on Maryland Government. See CoM-
MISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 7, at 106.
116. Aside from full state funding, there are actually only three choices for school
finance reform in Missouri:
A District power equalizing-Basically, this system is a commitment by the state
to the principle that the relationship between effort (the tax rate a district decides to
levy) and offering (money the district spends on education) of each district will be the
same. Each district determines its own effort. At any given tax level, every local
district raises the same amount of money per pupil through local revenue plus state
aid. The problem with district power equalizing is that the state fixes the number of
dollars that can be spent by the district (although it does guarantee that amount). For
a thorough explanation, see J. CooNs, supra note 7, at 200-50.
B. School district reorganization-This plan involves re-drawing districts to pro-
vide equal assessed valuation per pupil in each district. The problem with this ap-
proach is the subsequent fluctuations in property value. Constant re-drawing is
necessary to keep the districts "equal." See Texas School Finance, supra note 108, at
266.
C. "'Beefed-up"foundation plan-Missouri could subsidize the present system to
assure a per-pupil expenditure level by such local district near that of the wealthiest
districts. This plan, however, requires an immense amount of state aid, and it still
links private wealth to school spending. In addition, adopting a full state funding
program leaves this high expenditure option open at the state's desire. See CoMMIS-
SION REPORT 1973, supra note 7, at 105-06.
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resents the best method of equalizing public school finance.
Centralized state funding for Missouri schools has several advan-
tages. Initially, better revenue sources exist for the state than for lo-
cal school districts. 17 There is no need to rely on a local property
tax. The diversity of tax sources from a statewide tax base enables
Missouri to make only moderate tax rate increases to increase school
funding." " State sales and income taxes also tend to be more respon-
sive to changes in the economy than local property taxes." 9 Further-
more, the State of Missouri has distinct tax administration
advantages over local governments. 2 ° Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, centralized state funding promotes equality in financing
at a given monetary level.
12 1
The primary obstacle to the implementation of complete state
117. During the 1977-78 fiscal year, Missouri collected approximately $540 mil-
lion in personal income taxes, $90 million in corporate taxes, $656 million in state
sales taxes, $60 million in cigarette taxes, and $19 million in inheritance taxes. Tele-
phone conversation with Mr. Thompson, State Dep't of Revenue, Jefferson City, Mo.
(March 5, 1979).
Local districts, on the other hand, derive practically all of their revenue from local
property taxes. See generally ADVISORY COMM'N. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, submitted to THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, STATE-
LOCAL REVENUE SYSTEMS AND EDUCATIONAL FINANCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT 1971].
118. Diversity of taxes tends to promote less distortion in private sector decisions,
and also creates less incentive to evade taxes. Small rate increases in several taxes
may create less disturbance than one large rate hike. Broadening the tax base in-
creases horizontal equity, economic efficiency, and ease of administration. Interstate
tax competition has encouraged tax diversification. States have moderated tax rates
and sought new sources of tax revenue. See COMMISSION REPORT 1971, supra note
117, at 3-8.
119. Income taxes, and to a lesser degree state sales taxes, are more progressive
than local property taxes. Most scholars and economists concerned with public
finance believe that lower-income households pay larger percentages of their incomes
for property taxes than do higher-income households. See D. NETZER, ECONOMICS
OF THE PROPERTY TAx 40 (1966); EDUCATION FINANCE CENTER, EDUC. COMM'N OF
THE STATES, THE REGRESSIVITY OF THE PROPERTY TAX 1 (1976). See generall,
Shannon, supra note 111.
120. "Economies of scale" favor Missouri handling school financing. The state's
large size and the large amount of statewide economic activity explain the relatively
low administrative costs. Locally imposed taxes are subject to higher administrative
costs due to independent units of government, overlapping taxes, etc. See COMMIS-
SION REPORT 1971, supra note 117, at 3-6.
121. See COMMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 7, at 123 (With full state funding,
"uniformity would be the rule-modified, however, by special needs or costs in some
jurisdictions and by limited local add-on spending. .. ").
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funding in Missouri is the state's attainment of resources to replace
local tax revenues.'22 Missouri, however, possesses an abundance of
alternative tax sources. A recent government report revealed that
Missouri has "the greatest untapped taxing potential" of all the states
in the "plains" region of the United States. 123 A mere one percent
increase in the Missouri sales tax would yield approximately 220 mil-
lion dollars in additional state revenue.' 24 A similar amount of funds
would result from moderately increasing corporate and personal in-
come tax rates. 125 Should the state decide to provide the least change
in the status quo, a uniform statewide property tax would produce
the funds necessary for education.
126
A threatening aspect of this proposal is that full state funding will
lower rather than raise the quality of education. Educators caution
that centralized financing creates a "compromise" education. 127 This
122. Local and county sources supplied approximately $583 million toward Mis-
souri school financing in the 1977-78 school year. When effectuating full state fund-
ing, Missouri must replace this lost local revenue. See 1978 SCHOOL REPORT, supra
note 1, at 46.
123. See COMMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 7, at 94. The plains states men-
tioned in the report included Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota and South Dakota. The study revealed that Missouri, by taxing itself as much
as Minnesota (the "highest effort" state in the "plains"), could increase its total reve-
nue by approximately $700 million. Furthermore, a conventional taxing system as
complete and thorough as New York's (the highest taxing state in the nation) would
yield about $1.1 billion in additional revenue. The report concluded that every state
except New York, Wisconsin and Vermont could raise its per-pupil spending level to
the 90th percentile by using substantially less than its entire untapped relative tax
capacity. Id
124. Missouri's sales tax revenue for 1977-78 was based on a 3% sales tax rate.
Raising the rate to 4% provides the $220 million. See note 117 supra. Additional
revenues could be easily obtained by similar increases in cigarette, inheritance, and
automobile taxes.
125. Missouri should intensify its state income tax rate for school finance pur-
poses. States making heavy use of the income tax for financing have found it superior
to others in "productivity, elasticity, equity, and ease of administration." The fact
that the income tax is moderately progressive is also desirable. COMMISSION REPORT
1971, supra note 117, at 3-10. See generally B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, W. SCANLON, &
M. COHEN, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNA-
TIVES (1972).
126. A statewide property tax shifts the burden among individual property owners
in different localities due to the uniform tax. The system at least makes everyone pay
property taxes at the same rate. The total tax burden, however, remains with the
property owners as a group. See COMMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 7, at 74.
127. In addition to this "compromise" education argument, some argue that a
centralized funding system terminates the opportunity and the responsibility of work-
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concept, however, would allow Missouri to fund schools at any level
it desires; it may set the per-pupil expenditure level wherever it
desires. Centralized state funding clearly does not mandate medioc-
rity. If Missouri wants to fund all districts at the highest practical
level, it must collect additional revenues. In the alternative, financing
schools with an average or "compromise" amount of funds at least
provides unfformity, which is more desirable than conditioning edu-
cation upon local wealth. 2 '
Constant objections to full state funding prevail. Foremost among
the objections is the loss of local autonomy in education. Local con-
trol over spending options, however, need not be equated with control
over revenue options.' 29 Numerous studies indicate that centralized
financing and decentralized policymaking are not mutually exclu-
sive. 130 School district spending and operational decisions can and
should remain at the local level. Indeed, the state must work closely
with all school districts to be aware of needs and expenses unique to
each area.13 '
ing at the local level, thereby taking away "local incentive." See J. COONS, supra note
7, at 30-45. But see notes 132-34 and accompanying text infra.
128. Indeed, educators never claim that full state funding of public schools is un-
fair; they merely give opinions as to the practicality of such a system. See J. COONS,
supra note 7, at 35; Thomas, Equalizing Educational Opportunity Through School Fi-
nance Reform: .4 Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 255, 302-03 (1979).
129. One study of 10 states representing more than 29% of the national student
population concluded:
1) The extent of state controls over local district decision-making has no di-
rect relationship to the percentage of state funding.
2) With the exception of North Carolina, higher percentages of state funding
appear to be somewhat more conducive to innovations.
3) The rate of adoption of innovative educational practices is generally
higher in states which spend more per-pupil in absolute dollars. This relation-
ship is much stronger than that between rate of innovation and level of state
funding.
4) The extent of state controls appears to be related to increased per-pupil
expenditures.
B. LEVIN, supra note 125, at 268.
130. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE COMM'N. ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN NEW YORK STATE, THE FLEISCHMAN
REPORT ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEM. AND SEC. EDUCATION IN
NEW YORK STATE (1973) [hereinafter cited as FLEISCHMAN REPORT]; COMM. FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATING THE DISADVANTAGED (1970); ADVISORY
COMM'N. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AID TO LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT (1969). See also B. LEVIN, supra note 125, at 212-43 (a complete discussion and
evaluation of Hawaii's move to full state funding).
131. See notes I I & 13 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 19:133
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/6
EQUALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING
Finally, the financing scheme must include an opportunity for sup-
plemental monetary enrichment at the local level.'32 Some studies
recommend against such local aid'3 3 because it reinstates the element
of inequality. Stimulation of local incentive, however, weighs in the
favor of such aid. Local enrichment allows school districts optional
school improvements, 134 as well as surplus revenue for possible errors
in the state distributional formula or other unpredicted expenses.
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri must shift from traditional reliance on local property
taxes to state funding of education. Problems inherent in the present
system cannot otherwise be solved. Other states are moving in a sim-
ilar direction. Missouri will undoubtedly retain its present founda-
tion plan until a financially compelled school shutdown occurs.
Political changes and skyrocketing costs of education will stretch the
local property tax to its limits. In response, full state funding will
eventually prevail as educational needs demand.
132. See note 121 supra. The first policy recommendation on school finance by
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to the federal government
called for state assumption of all responsibility for financing public schools "with
opportunity for financial enrichment at the local level and assurance of retention of
appropriate local policymaking authority." ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 130, at 14.
133. See, e.g., FLEISCHMAN REPORT, supra note 130, at 213 (local supplementa-
tion will "lead back to disparities" that centralized state funding attempts to remedy).
134. Even though local financial enrichment may allow some shift from absolute
uniformity, it does so only after the state has provided every district with a relatively
high expenditure level. School districts desiring more revenue than this amount per-
pupil must pay additionally for it. See generally COMMISSION REPORT 1973, supra
note 7.
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